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Why Demographic Suicide? The Puzzles of European Fertility
Lant Pritchett Martina Viarengo a volume of essays on topics in demography honoring Paul demeny would be incomplete without asking why large parts of the european civilization that produced Paul, a gentleman and a scholar in the finest sense of both words, have decided, through the aggregate decisions of women and men, to commit gradual "demographic suicide." one would think that potential mothers and fathers, facing the promise of peace and relative prosperity, would choose to have children. But, puzzlingly, many people across europe are choosing to have fewer children than will produce stable, much less growing, populations. demography is destiny. the consequences of shifts in fertility (even as moderated or even partially reversed in the future) will have substantial consequences on many aspects of life: aging, health care costs, marital and family relationships, labor markets, immigration, the fiscal sustainability of social insurance programs, and schooling. if anything like the current fertility trends persists, the outcome will have profound consequences for what it means to be a "nation" and what are acceptable social relationships within a nation-state. Current projections of the rate of natural increase imply either unsustainably large reductions in the working-age population or substantially higher levels of the influx of "non-nationals" (or a little of both).
the fact that women and men are making choices that result in lifetime childlessness must be symptomatic of a revolution in human affairs. leaving a posterity has, for thousands of years of human history, been an integral part of the very definition of prosperity and happiness for the typical person. those who remained childless-priests and nuns, monks and eunuchs-were recognized as choosing radically different paths to human meaning and happiness or were regarded as unfortunate.
Below-replacement fertility and disciplines this "post-modern" demographic transition to below-replacement level fertility (BrF) represents a puzzle for a number of disciplines, including demography, evolutionary psychology, and economics-especially as this involves a considerable fraction of the population who never have any children.
BRF is a bother for demographers
we recently read a paper that began, "the official projections predict that in the year 3023 the population of Japan will be one." the precision of this projection a thousand years into the future, while far-fetched, reveals a simple fact: by mathematical necessity, long-range population projections tend to infinity (if births consistently exceed deaths), to zero (if deaths consistently exceed births), to some constant level (if they exactly balance), or to cycles (if they vary in certain ways).
while demography is an excellent descriptive discipline, because demographic facts are often the earliest to be established and best documented, it cannot be a predictive science without being a behavioral science. as demographers started making long-run projections, they knew exactly what fertility had to be arithmetically in order for their models to produce stationary populations-the "replacement level"-but they had no positive behavioral theory of why humans would choose to have exactly that many babies. the fundamental problem with demography as a predictive science is that the people whose fertility behavior was being projected had no concern for the knife-edged properties the forecasters faced. Since demography had no behavioral model to explain why people had the number of children they did, they could not model how aggregate conditions of population would feed back into the individual factors that affected fertility. (the one theory which does have a feedback loop from population to fertility, that of malthus, is irrelevant to explaining below-replacement fertility in conditions of prosperity.) as long as fertility was above replacement and declining, official projections could pretend fertility rates would do what they needed to do to make projection easy, sensible, and non-controversial: converge to replacement. european fertility has now definitively shown that, at least so far, women feel no pressure to make their fertility decisions add up to reasonable long-run projections of aggregate populations. all of the early demographic projections "predicted" that fertility rates around the world would fall from above 2.1 to exactly 2.1 for no reason other than that fertility levels below that level produced declining populations; and if tFr declined and remained low, then population went to zero at some long time horizon, and that was embarrassing as a prediction (vishnevsky 1991) .
But this is really just a bother for demographers for two reasons. one, nearly everyone accepts that demography is a descriptive science, so its lack of predictive power is not a threat to a disciplinary paradigm. two, to the extent most demographers became involved in predictions and engaged in purposive activity to change fertility, it was almost exclusively because of concerns that populations were too big and/or growing too fast (as exponential growth of human populations appears environmentally unsustainable). to the extent europeans are helping to reduce global population stresses-for whatever reasons-good for them.
BRF is a conundrum for evolutionary psychology over the past 15 years evolutionary psychology, based on darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, has become a major theoretical perspective (Confer et al. 2010) . evolutionary psychology can be regarded as an approach potentially applicable to all areas of psychological research (Gaulin and mcBurney 2008) . Fundamental to this approach is "understanding the human mind/brain mechanisms in evolutionary perspective" (Buss 1999, p. 3), the rationale being that our minds evolved to solve problems faced by our ancestors within an environment of evolutionary adaptation (workman and reader 2008). according to evolutionary psychology, evolution by natural selection has led to morphological as well as psychological adaptations. Central to evolution by natural selection is the theory of parental investment and sexual selection (Buss 1995) . accordingly, evolutionary predispositions affect the nature of the human mind and lead to sex-specific choices that are the result of sex-specific issues faced during mating and reproduction.
evolutionary psychology provides a micro-level explanation for fertility patterns based on the quantity-quality tradeoff in the context of limited resources. this context seems to be appropriate to explain differentials in high-fertility, high-mortality regimes but not in low-and ultra-low-fertility regimes (Borgenhoff mulder 1998; lawson and mace 2010). Specifically, evolutionary fertility models have failed to explain why fertility declines with wealth and social status (Hill and reeve 2004) .
the surest way to guarantee lack of reproductive success is to choose not to reproduce, and that is what european men and women are doing. whatever pressures evolution has produced for shaping human psychology, it has produced substantial parts of a population without the characteristic that they choose to reproduce. one would think that a desire to reproduce would be one of the primary traits evolution would select for. But if people can overcome their evolutionary conditioning sufficiently to avoid reproducing, then it would seem they could also overcome their evolutionary conditioning to avoid doing whatever else was merely instrumental to reproducing. BrF in europe seems a paradigm-shattering phenomenon for evolutionary psychology. even if the discipline can save itself intellectually from the failure to adequately explain the spread of BrF in europe and elsewhere, it seems a decidedly poor model of why people are voluntarily leaving fewer-and in many cases no-genetic heirs. 1 BRF raises puzzles for economics economics claims to be a behavioral science and has never been burdened by attachment to specific psychological theories, evolutionary or otherwise. it seeks to explain changes in behavior as the result of changes in incomes (or endowments) or changes in prices/costs in their broadest sense. But does economics offer a persuasive explanation of BrF in europe?
the demographic transition, from high levels of mortality and fertility to low levels of both, produced two puzzles, especially for economists. the first was why fertility fell on average with economic development. the second was why richer households have fewer children than poorer households. Both of these puzzles are easily, if circularly, explained simply by saying that children are an "inferior good"-those for which, unlike "normal goods," demand declines with income (as it does for low-quality food staples like rice). However, even as heartless economists ourselves we are loath to admit that children might be an "inferior good." Becker (1960 Becker ( , 1981 and willis (1973) proposed two explanations why rises in income over time led to lower levels of fertility and why higherincome families had fewer children. First, they hypothesized that "child services" have a quantity and a quality component so that the same quantity of child services could be produced either by a large number of low-quality children or by a low number of high-quality children. in this way, even if child services are a normal good that rises with income, "quantity of children" could decline with income if "quality" per child rose fast enough. this model was widely invoked as being consistent with fertility falling over time with rising incomes, since formal education per child, taken as a crude index of "child quality," was demonstrably increasing over time as fertility fell.
Second, Becker noted that the consumption of goods requires time, hence the act of consumption is bundled with the use of time. therefore as the opportunity cost of time rises, either over time or across households, all time-intensive goods become more expensive relative to less time-intensive goods. So if one could separate increases in income from increases in the opportunity cost of time, then one should discover that demand for children increases with income as a normal good but decreases with price; thus the overall demand from an income increase is moderated (or possibly overwhelmed) by the price increase.
even if these two concepts-quantity of child services as a combination of quantity and quality, and opportunity cost of time-adequately explained the fall in fertility from high/moderate to low, these concepts (especially the first) are less applicable when fertility falls to zero.
one of the solutions to the paradox of rising income and falling consumption of a normal good was to deny that consumption of the normal good "child services" was falling, but rather to assert that demand for "qualityadjusted child services" rises with income. However, this exposes the problem that children come in integer quantities and that anything times zero is zero. that is, if one has zero children, then no matter how one "adjusts" quality, this is still zero child services. this means that the transition for an individual woman from "one high-quality child" to "zero children" is a massive discontinuity rather than a gradual transition. in terms of "child services," one quality-adjusted child is further from zero children than four non-qualityadjusted children.
this discontinuity is conceptually important to how we understand the transition to very low fertility. if we really think "demand for children" has been declining, then the shift from 2 to 1 to 0 is part of a continuous process. on the other hand, if we interpret the transition to low fertility as a rise in demand for child services with incomes, satisfied through a rise in child "quality," then the transition from demand for exactly 1 high-quality child to the demand for zero children requires something to explain this massive discontinuous drop in demand for child services.
two different causal mechanisms explaining a fall in observed fertility, "more quality" versus just "less demand (or quantity demanded) for children," might have the same predictions for average fertility but very different predictions about childlessness. Figure 1 shows the simulation at a normal distribution across individuals of a proxy for their demand for children that takes on continuous values, which then are obviously realized in discrete numbers of children (that match "demand" only loosely because of surprise (twins), mistakes, gender preferences, infertility, and so on). two different mechanisms are illustrated for a shift from medium to low to below-replacement fertility. one is a generally leftward shift of the index across women of demand/quantity demanded of children. this will cause childlessness (zero children) to grow as a fraction of women as there is only truncation at zero. in contrast, if the falling demand for numbers of children leads to a rise in the demand for child services and an accompanying increase in "quality" of children, then the distribution should "bunch up" on 1 child since this mechanism alone should not cause any increase in the fraction of women wanting zero children (simulated as truncation at one). in fact, the fraction of women with zero should decrease because demand for child services has increased.
this illustration implies that how we explain and interpret the drop to very low fertility hinges on how much childlessness there is-and how much of that childlessness involves ex post regret. at medium fertility the two distri-butions of simulated completed parity in Figure 1a and 1b look nearly identical. But at BrF one shows over 20 percent childlessness while the "quality children" narrative shows 50 percent at exactly one child. Figure 2 shows the fraction of women living in a household with no children at various ages for six countries. even though mexico, turkey, and Slovakia have relatively low Medium fertility: Mean = 3.5, std. dev = 1.3, truncation = 1 tFr, they represent the more traditional pattern of childbearing in women's mid-to late 20s, becoming nearly universal in the 30s followed by increasing "empty nests" in their 40s. Finland illustrates the opposite case. only 30 percent of women in their late 20s live in households with children, and the fraction of women living in households with no children rarely falls much below 30 percent. the netherlands has just as much late onset of fertility as Finland, but the fraction of households without children falls to 25 percent at its lowest. other european countries tend to be somewhere in between. while these cohort cross-sections don't tell the dynamic lifetime story, it is clear that some low-fertility countries experience a significant rise in the number of women who never live in a household with children: a five-fold difference between the fraction of women aged 35-39 in households without children in turkey versus Finland (6.2 versus 30.3).
at this stage it is difficult to disentangle what part of the very steep declines in fertility in europe (especially in Southern and eastern europe) was the result of a rapid shift in the desired timing of children to later ages for which cohort rates overstated the predicted lifetime declines; and what part resulted from a shift to permanently lower rates of fertility, including a rise in the number of women who intend to have no children over their lifetime (or who are willing to delay childbearing with the accompanying risk of involuntary infertility). there is no question that the percent of women with no children at age 30 has risen sharply over recent cohorts, but the evidence about completed fertility is more mixed. as shown in Figure 3 in eastern europe and across oeCd countries, interestingly, there is no correspondence between low fertility and childlessness. in eastern and South europe (e.g., Bulgaria, Czech republic, Hungary, Portugal) low fertility is accompanied by low childlessness (less than 10 percent), while in Finland relatively high total completed fertility (1.9) is associated with very high rates of women with no children (20 percent). this lack of clear association suggests that there are very different causal mechanisms that produce BrF. in particular, it is difficult to explain a rise in childlessness as an increase in demand for child services, regardless of how these services are quality-adjusted. this must instead be indicative of low demand for both children and child services.
What are close substitutes for children?
there are, then, two economic explanations of BrF. one is demand for high (schools, shopping), location relative to a city with its positives (entertainment, restaurants) and negatives (crime, noise). the overall price of a specific house is determined by the market willingness to pay for its individual features, and the choice of a house reflects a person weighing his or her own valuation of the hedonic characteristics against the market valuation.
one way a fall in the quantity of children demanded can occur is if children become more expensive. another way is if another good arises that is a close substitute for some important component of the "child services bundle" that reduces its overall value. in those countries with BrF combined with high childlessness, what are the components of the hedonic bundle that is a child, and what are the close substitutes for those hedonic components that have caused the demand for children to fall?
Old-age security: An unstable dynamic of individual and society one reason to have a child is to have someone to take care of you when you are too old to work. this has a financial element and an emotional element. in some times and places, being left a widow without sons (or offspring) put a woman at risk of destitution, since other relatives had no obligations and the state was too weak to provide income security or care. especially in western and northern europe, the onset of government-provided income security and health insurance/care has led to a nearly complete disconnect between having children and well-being in old age. the differential generosity and dependability of government-provided care for the elderly has been frequently invoked to explain overall declines in fertility and might explain the differential in childlessness, even at low fertility rates, between europe and the united States and among Southern/eastern europe and northern/ western europe.
this explanation for ever-declining fertility in europe is unstable. in other words, what might be true for individuals-that they can benefit in old age from tax-financed transfers whether they had a child or not-cannot be true of society as a whole. if no one has a child, then eventually there are no taxpayers; and unless social programs are financed entirely out of savings, the programs must fail. on their current trajectories, european countries are headed for a demographic "fiscal cliff" (quite apart from the temporary fiscal problems they currently experience) in which (especially without migration) the ratio of workers to those dependent on transfers becomes far too small. and, with the inversion of the demographic pyramid that low fertility has created, the actual labor requirements of both health care and non-medical elder care become a significant part of the labor force.
this may mean that the greater the number of people who believe and act on the premise that the state will support them in their old age, the more quickly that promise becomes untenable. this will also complete the cycle from children being regarded as positive externalities, to children being regarded as negative externalities, back to children as positive externalitieswith the accompanying shifts from pronatal to antinatal (or neutral) to pronatal policies and social norms.
externality is a key concept in normative economics. the fundamental welfare theorems (a formal expression of adam Smith's key insights) articulate the conditions under which private individuals making selfinterested choices lead to a social outcome that is Pareto-optimal-defined as an allocation from which no one person can be made better off without making another person worse off. one of the key conditions under which a decentralized market produces a Pareto-optimal allocation is that the costs and benefits of decisions fall upon the person (or firm) making the decision. if private decisions are truly private, then public policy can ignore people's choices across goods. Similarly, public policy needn't meddle with what people choose to produce and sell either as individuals or as firms as they attempt to maximize their returns. However, if private decisions don't fully reflect the costs and consequences of decisions, there is an externality. the classic example is pollution.
the concept of an externality was recognized long before its formalization in economics, and societies have always had two mechanisms to respond to the misalignment of incentives from externalities: informal mechanisms of social norms and formal mechanisms of reward and punishment. Simply put, people who don't recognize the negative externalities of their behavior are labeled and treated as boors. Conversely, those who engage in unreciprocated kindness are publicly lauded for their positive externality-incorporating behavior. Formally governments can engage in taxing (or regulation or outright prohibitions) of behaviors with negative externalities or offer subsidies (or regulation or mandates) to attempt to align private and public incentives when there are externalities.
How does this relate to having children? nearly all of the costs and benefits of having children are privately borne, and both costs (monetary, time, and psychic) and benefits are massive. any reasonable theory of childbearing involves people weighing these anticipated private costs and benefits among other considerations. But are there externalities having to children, and, if so, are children a positive externality or a negative externality? more particularly, under what conditions are children a positive or negative externality? answers to these questions have come in three phases.
there is no question that historically births were regarded as a positive externality. Hence a wide variety of social norms celebrated and encouraged childbearing, and parents who were unable to have children were regarded as objects of pity. in most traditional societies high fertility was not only associated with private wealth and power (demeny 2003; Sinding 1991) , but also generally celebrated as making the society (from kith and clan up to empire) better off. Governments also tended to regard population as a boon.
it is only very recently that children began to be perceived, even in "normal" times, as a negative externality. the fall in mortality accelerated population growth while fertility was temporarily maintained at high levels. neo-malthusian theorists (Coale and Hoover 1958; myrdal 1968) suggested that this unprecedented population growth in the developing world was detrimental to socioeconomic development. the onset of the environmental movement led to a concern for "sustainability" and popularized jeremiads like The Population Bomb (ehrlich 1968) , The Limits to Growth (meadows et al. 1974) , and The Twenty-ninth Day (Brown 1978) .
these views of children as negative externalities justified actions to create new social norms favoring smaller families, subsidize means of reducing fertility by making contraception widely available, offer financial incentives, and, in extreme cases like China, enact prohibitive regulations. needless to say, programs premised on the notion that children were a negative externality created tension with existing social norms and perceived national interests. if in fact children are a negative externality, then a perfectly legitimate response is for societies to encourage people to "internalize" these effects in their childbearing decisions.
the decline of european fertility to well below replacement levels has again put the shoe on the other foot. many observers now feel that children are a positive externality justifying pronatalist actions by european governments. Fears of "fertility implosion" and "baby deficits" that started in the 1990s, and increasing awareness of the consequences of these demographic changes, have led the european Commission to set a "return to demographic growth" as one of its "three essential priorities" (european Commission, Green Paper 2005). more recently, some european countries, in particular those with ultra low fertility, have adopted pronatalist policies. measures to increase fertility include direct financial incentives such as "baby bonuses"-introduced in Spain in 2007 and in russia for the second child in 2006. other policies such as tax deductions or welfare provisions like childcare, child allowances, and other in-kind benefits have been introduced in varying degrees. in addition, an increasing number of european countries have adopted policies to support parents and their labor force participation, in the form of parental paid leave and gender equality and other family-friendly policies.
2
Children as a source of meaning and social validation
Children provide men and women with a source of life meaning and a personal definition of their "role" in society that brings them both internalized and external reinforcements of their behavior. in some societies the social construction of gender roles produced positive reinforcement for men who were good providers and for women who were good nurturers, and the roles of father and mother were constructed in these terms.
wide-ranging changes in opportunities, in the structure of economic production toward more traditionally "feminine" work skills, and in social attitudes have decreased the cost to women of seeking meaning and life satisfaction from their economic lives. we deliberately frame these changes as much larger than the shift in "wages" (where women's wages continue to lag behind men's) and instead consider them in the broader sense of the intrinsic reward from work and career.
what we are suggesting is that typical economic formulations look at well-being as a choice between bundles of child services (with a quantity/ quality dimension) and material goods. in this sense the tradeoff is between more or fewer children and more or fewer consumption goods, and between work hours and leisure hours where work hours are seen as providing not positive utility but a means to purchase goods (including consumption and investment goods for children, like toys and university education). in this calculus, increases in women's wages have the following income and price effects: 1) they make the woman (and the couple if the woman is in a couple) wealthier, which should raise the demand for (quality-adjusted) children; 2) because children are time-intensive, rising wages reduce the demand for children even for a given level of earned income; 3) rising wages increase the relative price of gaining utility through children versus all other material goods, so would increase work hours. as we pointed out above, there is no unambiguous prediction here about the number of children, but the first two points argue against childlessness in favor of fewer children with more investment of time and resources per child.
we are pointing to a different type of effect of the shift in gender roles and expectations, namely that women are more likely to achieve life satisfaction from market work that is inherently rewarding. High-status occupations are just that: "high status." Status in and from these occupations tends to be performance-dependent, and time invested is a key component of success in nearly every high-status field.
Children are only available in discrete, integer-numbered, units. So the choice of a "little bit" of child services is difficult. data suggest that having one school-aged child (compared to none) adds about 10 percent to the time devoted to care activities for women aged 25-44 in europe (and only 4 percent more care time for men) (oeCd Social Policy database 2011). the difference in this time allocation between gender-equitable countries and other countries is quite small. adding a second child only adds half as much time. So a big choice is between "childless" and "children," since a second child adds much less incremental time commitment.
Marriage, family, children
Kathryn edin (2005) explores the question of why non-marital teenage childbearing in very poor neighborhoods in the united States is so high. Her answer is that the teens want someone to love and to be loved by someone; and in the midst of the negative social and economic circumstances they face, the only way they feel they can achieve that is by having children of their own. another component of the demand for children is to create another human being with whom to have an intimate and loving relationship. the question is, if people are having fewer (or possibly no) children, what is substituting in their lives for this love and intimacy? this question is even more complicated as one western notion of marriage was of a romantic attachment of a man and a woman of which children would be the product. marriage as a social institution has historically been connected with the social regulation of sex and especially of childbearing, as it created obligations of caring for children born to the couple. Sexual activity, childbearing, and marriage have become disconnected so that increasingly it is socially acceptable to have one without either of the other two. But this has happened in different ways in different parts of europe.
we can classify european countries into three categories (low, medium, high) by the total first marriage rate and by the proportion of births that are extramarital. Significant changes in both of these indicators have occurred since 1960: the median first marriage rate has nearly halved by 2003, and extramarital births have risen from 6 percent in 1960 to 29 percent in 2003 (Council of europe 2005; oeCd 2010). So both marriage as an institution that is an expected part of the life cycle and the expectation of an association between formal and/or legal marriage and childbearing are no longer social norms. in cross-section, the countries with the highest tFrs tend to be those with the highest extramarital childbearing. all countries with a tFr over 1.7 (Sweden, uK, France, norway, iceland, Finland, denmark) have shares of extramarital births above 40 percent. in these societies, marriage is passé but having children is not. at the opposite pole, a number of countries (most in eastern europe) have high rates of marriage and low shares of extramarital births but very low fertility. Billari and Kohler (2004) argue that the generally positive relationship between marriage rates and fertility rates disappeared in europe in the 1990s. alternative models of household formation and parenting have emerged: the nordic model, where childbearing is disconnected from marriage but persists; and the Southern model, where marriage remains the main characteristic of union formation but fertility has reached very low levels (Kohler, Bilari, and ortega 2006; rand 2009 ). a decline in marriage rates goes hand in hand with an increase in informal unions such as cohabitation or "living apart together" (Kohler, Bilari, and ortega 2006) . drawing on family and household surveys, Perelli-Harris et al. (2012) investigate women's family and fertility histories in 11 european countries. they find that only in norway and France are a significant share of women who were cohabiting at the start of a union still cohabiting three years after the child's birth, as opposed to italy and eastern european countries, where the share still cohabiting declines sharply, suggesting that the institution of marriage has not been displaced.
it is not at all obvious to us what is going on with the "demand for intimacy." unlike the cases of old-age security (where the state was an obvious substitute) and life meaning (where professional or career accomplishment became more widely available for women), it is not clear that there has been a reduction in the cost of any close substitute for the human intimacy of family (marriage and child) relationships. in some parts of Southern and eastern europe (e.g., Spain, Greece, italy, Portugal, Croatia) we find the persistence of marriage as a source of intimacy and near universal childbearing. in other countries (e.g., the Baltics) we find low marriage rates, high extramarital fertility, and ultra-low fertility.
But in at least some countries in northern europe there seems to be a declining incidence of marriage (and of stable conjugal unions more generally) and moderate rates of fertility but combined with a high level of childlessness. Finland, for instance, has a tFr well below replacement (1.76), a high rate of extramarital childbearing, and substantial childlessness (20 percent in the 1965 cohort).
what is substituting in the lives of women and men for the love and intimacy that came from parent-child relationships? it is certainly not a significant increase in marital love and intimacy without children substituting for less marital love and intimacy with children-particularly in countries where marriage and long-term cohabitation have declined.
Conclusion
economics is about making choices given constraints. Gains in productivity ease constraints and hence create new possibilities. the usual consequence of increasing possibilities is that people consume more of every good thingwhether in quantity, quality, or both. Human civilizations have typically regarded children as a good thing. therefore the fact that people in civilizations at the pinnacle of possibilities are choosing not just fewer children, but fewer children than required to sustain the civilization itself, is a major puzzle for the human sciences.
the standard economic explanation of the fertility transition resembles our explanation of higher food expenditures but falling consumption of staples. as income expands from initially very low levels, people consume more calories; then as incomes increase further, food expenditures continue to rise but mostly by consuming a higher-quality bundle of food, which has a higher cost per calorie. at even higher levels of income, total calories consumed stop rising, and may even start falling, even as total expenditures on food continue to rise. So "food consumption" as measured in calories might fall even though food is a good thing, but "food expenditures" continue to rise because cost per calorie rises. in a similar manner, tFr might fall but demand for children-properly measured-is really rising with income.
one might not see a fall from low to very low fertility as a puzzle because it is a continuation of that trend. However, this is a very poor explanation of voluntary childlessness, since "quality adjustment" obviously stops working at zero children.
as we have seen, the pattern of low fertility across europe appears to take several different forms when it comes to childlessness. in Southern and eastern europe there are very low levels of cumulative fertility but with very few women ultimately childless. in northern and western europe similar (or even higher) fertility rates are associated with lifetime childless rates approaching 20 percent-so one in five women are making choices that lead to no children at all. this cannot be the result of increased demand for children.
therefore we cannot avoid the question of why demand for childreneven for quality-adjusted children-would fall in countries with high levels of prosperity. other economic answers are that children became much more expensive or substitutes for children became much cheaper. it is hard for us to believe that the reduction to very low levels of fertility is primarily substitution from "child services" to "other material goods." that is, while some of the choice is to have fewer children but bigger houses and faster cars, this explanation seems too shallow. the other alternative is that close substitutes for individual elements of what children provide have become much cheaper. Certainly the steady expansion of the state as caregiver plays a role (though one that the induced BrF choices undermine by making state support unsustainable). the expansion of other domains in which women are given social status and intrinsic satisfaction (over and above the pure wage component) is another likely factor-one that fits especially well with low fertility and high childlessness. Finally, there remains a big open question of how children fit into an overall pattern of "family" in the post modern era. 1 recognizing this, some attempts have been made to address this conundrum. the "relaxed fertility-selection" hypothesis (Kaplan et al. 2002; Keister 2003; aarssen 2005) has been proposed, according to which in modern societies a more intensive investment is required to ensure the offspring success. on the other hand, the "transmission competition hypothesis" (aarssen and altman 2006) relies on a tradeoff parents face between "gene transmission" (offspring production) and "meme transmission" (legacy drive), implying that career development, accumulation of wealth, and focus on social status may explain belowreplacement fertility in modern societies. (But this is obviously no longer based on evolutionary biology as "genes" are a biological fact in the way that "memes" are not.) 2 analyses of the effect of pronatalist policies on fertility suggest that the impact at best is very limited (neyer 2003; Gauthier 2005; mcdonald 2006; Goldstein and Kluesner 2009) . Such policies also were not successful when implemented in the interwar years (demeny 2003) . many of these policies have been perceived as being too narrow (Coleman 2012) .
